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Abstract
For a society to function eﬃciently, it is desirable that all members of
this society care no only about themselves, but also about the society as
a whole, i.e., about all the other individuals from the society. In practice,
most people are only capable of caring about a few other individuals.
We analyze this problem from the viewpoint of decision theory and show
that even with such imperfect individuals, it is possible to make sure
that everyone’s decisions are aﬀected by the society as a whole: namely,
it is suﬃcient to make sure that people have emotional attachment to
those few individuals who are capable of caring about the society as a
whole.
As a side eﬀect, our result provides a possible explanation of why the
Biblical commandment to love your God encourages ethical behavior.
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Formulation of the Problem

Ideally, it is desirable that everyone should make decisions taking into account
not only his or her own interest, but also the interest of the society as a whole,
the interests of all the people from the society.
The problem is that most individuals are only capable of caring about a
few other people. In the society consisting of such imperfect individuals, what
can we do to enhance their caring about the society as a whole?
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Towards Formalizing the Problem

The notion of utility: reminder. How can we describe this desired situation in precise terms? Decision theory has shown (see, e.g., [8]) that rational
individuals select a decision that maximizes the expected value of their utility
u.
Just like many physical quantities, utility is determined modulo an arbitrary linear transformation u → u′ = a · u + b, depending on selecting the
measuring unit and the starting point.
What determined utility: case of a fully self-interested individual.
In other to formalize our problem, we need to recall what determines the
individual’s utility. Let us start with the simplest case when an individual’s
decisions are determined only by his or own interests and are not eﬀect on
what happens to the others.
How can we formalize this situation? Let ui denote the utility of the i-th
person. The above self-interest assumption means that this utility ui depends
only on the beneﬁt bi (amount of diﬀerent goods) obtained by this individual:
ui = fi (bi ).
The beneﬁts bi are usually small. When the inputs bi are small, we can
expand the dependence fi (bi ) in Taylor series and safely ignore quadratic and
higher order terms in this extension, resulting in fi (bi ) = ai + ci · bi for some
coeﬃcients ai and ci . Since, as we have mentioned, utility is deﬁned modulo
a linear transformation anyway, we can select the utility scale for the i-th
individual in such a way that ui = fi (bi ) is simply equal to the i-th beneﬁt,
i.e., to
ui = b i .
Types of care about others. Situations in which the person’s utility is
determined only by his or her own beneﬁts and do not depend on the beneﬁts or
utilities of others are rare. Most people do care about others, either rationally
or emotionally. How can we describe this care?
Rational care. Rational care means, in these terms, that the utility ui of
the i-th person is determined not only by the beneﬁts uj obtained by this
person, but also by In this case, the utility ui of the i-th person depends not
only on the beneﬁt bi of this same person, but also on the beneﬁts bj of other
individuals.
Similar to the above case, we can expand this dependence in Taylor series,
keep only linear terms in this expansion. In this case, we have ui = ai + ci ·
∑
bi +
cij · bj , where cij is the degree to which the utility of the i-th person
j̸=i
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depends on the beneﬁts of the j-th individual. Similarly to the self-interest
case, we can then re-scale the utility so that we get ai = 0, ci = 1, and thus,
u i = bi +

∑

cij · bj .

j̸=i

Emotional care (aka love). Emotional care means that we care not only
whether the others are well-fed, well-clothed, etc., we also – and mostly – care
about whether they are happy. In this case, the utility of the i-th individual
depends on the utilities uj of one or several other folks. Similarly to the above
case, we can approximate this dependence by an appropriate linear formula:
ui = bi +

∑

dij · uj ,

j̸=i

for some coeﬃcients dij ; see, e.g., [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9, 10, 11, 12].
General case. In general, our decisions are inﬂuenced both by the rational
care (i.e., by the others’ beneﬁts bj ) and by the emotional care (i.e., by the
others’ utilities uj ). In this case, the utility ui of the i-th person is determined
both by the values bj and uj . In the linear approximation, this general case
can be described as follows:
ui = b i +

∑

cij · bj +

j̸=i

∑

dij · uj .

j̸=i

What we have and what we would like to have. As we have mentioned,
most people are only capable of caring about a few others. For such people,
most values cij and dij are 0s, the sums only contain a few terms.
Ideally, we would like to have, for each i, all the coeﬃcients cij positive,
and ideally, all equal – or at least close to each other – to make sure that we
care equally about all the others, about the society as a whole, and not mostly
about one small group within this society. How can we achieve that?
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Natural Solution

Natural solution. A natural solution to the above problem comes from the
fact that some people are capable of caring about the society as a whole. In
∑
other words, we have an individual i0 for whom ui0 = bi0 + c0 · bj for some
j
c0 .
In the ideal case, this individual cares about others exactly as much as he
or she cares about him/herself. In this case, c0 = 1 and
ui0 =

∑
j

bj .
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Then, all we need to do is make sure that everyone loves this ideal person,
i.e., that the expression for the utility ui of every person contains a terms
proportional to ui0 :
ui = bi + cii0 · ui0 + . . .
Since this ideal person’s utility is proportional to the sum of beneﬁts of the
people in the society, this means that the utility ui contains a term proportional
to this sum, i.e., that
ui = bi + cii0 ·

∑

bj + . . .

j

This is – almost – exactly what we wanted. Almost because while we achieved
the person’s care of the society as a whole, a person may still care about his
or her own small group even more. So, we need to make sure that this “love
of the ideal person” is strong enough – ideally, stronger than this person’s love
for others j ̸= i0 .
This idea is not as revolutionary as it may seem. At ﬁrst glance, the
above idea may seem non-standard and revolutionary, but this is actually how
societies are run – hero worship, veneration of living saints, love of the leaders,
these are all examples of exactly the above phenomenon.
Why need to love God: a speculative discussion. Instead of the actual
ideal person i0 , we consider God or saints who, according to the religious
teachings, care about the society as a whole. This may be of the possible
explanations why in the Bible, an important commandment is that You shall
love the Lord your God. At ﬁrst glance, it may sound strange: if God wants
us to behave better, why not say so explicitly as in other commandments. One
of the main objectives of religion is to make us ethically better, they prefer
an ethical person who may not be following all the requirements to the one
who follows the rules but who is ethically deﬁcient. At ﬁrst glance, the fact
that the commandment to love your God is ﬁrst and ethical commandments
are next seems to indicate the opposite preference: that it is more important
how you pray that how you behave.
The above discussion shows that loving the ideal God is exactly the best
way to make us behave ethically better, to care about society as a whole – this
implies other ethical commandments and is, thus, rightfully the ﬁrst of them.
Similarly, one can explain the second part of the ﬁrst commandment: not
to have other gods, because, depending on what other gods care about, this
will change our relative care of others and thus, decrease the positive ethical
eﬀect of caring about the ideal person i0 .
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